Here is my final posting on the recently concluded CoP6 II.

The posting contains four "outakes" from the comprehensive ENB coverage. I
am doing this as I realise it is difficult for most of you to keep up with
their excellent bulletins.

The information below is as follows:

1.  Information relating to cooperation with Relevant International
Organizations, including the CBD

2.  the information relating to LULUCF, both from CoP II and the subsequent
SBSTA.

3. The Closing Plenary, so you can be sure it is all over until Marrakesh!

4.  The ENB analysis - a useful way to pick up the significant components
of the agreement.
 

The ENB summary of the entire Cop 6 II, plus all previous summaries, can be
found at:

http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/climate/cop6bis/
 

Best wishes
 

David Duthie
E-mail:  david.duthie@unep.org

************************************************************

1. Cooperation with Relevant International Organizations:

At the SBSTA meeting on 24 July, Chair Dovland noted ongoing initiatives
between the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), including: a CBD discussion note and responses submitted by
the UNFCCC Parties; a CBD Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group to carry
out a pilot assessment on advice to integrate biodiversity into
UNFCCC implementation; and a proposed joint liaison group between
the two Secretariats. Jan Plesnik, Chair of the CBD Subsidiary
Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, reported
on initiatives in the CBD to address interlinkages between
biodiversity and climate change. Bob Watson, IPCC Chair, reported
on the preparation of an IPCC Technical Paper on linkages between
climate and biodiversity.

The SBSTA then invited Ian Carruthers (Australia) and Jimena Nieto
Carrasco (Colombia) to undertake informal consultations on this
matter in order to help formulate draft conclusions. On 27 July,
the SBSTA adopted conclusions on this matter
(FCCC/SBSTA/2001/L.3).

On cooperation with other conventions, the conclusions emphasize
the need for cooperation with other relevant conventions,
including the CBD, and endorsed the formation of a joint liaison
group between the UNFCCC and CBD Secretariats. It also invited the
Secretariat of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification to
participate in this group, in order to explore options for further
cooperation, including the possibility of a joint work plan and/or
workshop. Parties are invited to submit their further views on
cooperation between the three conventions by 15 October 2001. A
request by the CBD that IPCC develop a paper to consider relevant
interlinkages was endorsed.

****************************************************

2.  LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY (LULUCF):

JI and the CDM:
On sinks in the CDM, the COP agrees that afforestation and
reforestation shall be the only eligible LULUCF projects under the
CDM during the first commitment period, with implementation of
these projects guided by the LULUCF principles defined elsewhere
in the annex and by the definitions and modalities developed by
SBSTA for decision at COP-8 including on non-permanence,
additionality, leakage, scale uncertainties, and socio-economic
and environmental impacts. LULUCF activities under the CDM in
future commitment periods are to be decided in negotiations on the
second commitment period.

LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY (LULUCF): LULUCF was
considered in a closed negotiating group co-chaired by Harald
Dovland (Norway) and Philip Gwage (Uganda) from 16-18 July. The
group sought to reduce differences on key outstanding issues,
including whether Article 3.4 (additional activities) should be
allowed during the first commitment period, and options for
limiting the activities; principles governing LULUCF activities;
and Article 3.3 (afforestation, reforestation and deforestation)
and 3.4 definitions and accounting rules. On Article 3.4
activities, some countries opposed their inclusion, stressing that
it represents a renegotiation of the Kyoto targets and undermines
the integrity of the Protocol. Other Parties emphasized that
LULUCF is fundamental to ratification. Canada, Australia and
Japan, joined by the Russian Federation, presented a proposal on
Article 3.4 forest management, which relied on negotiated maximum
levels of forest management credits for individual countries. This
proposal - as well as proposals by New Zealand and the EU - set
the stage for the high-level negotiations. The discussions were
based on the Pronk text as well as text carried over from The
Hague. Based on these and previous discussions, a Note was
prepared by the Co-Chairs of the four negotiating groups
(FCCC/CP/20001/CRP.8) outlining clear options.

During the high-level segment of COP-6 Part II, a closed
negotiating group on LULUCF was facilitated by Raúl Estrada
(Argentina).

Bonn Agreement: The section on LULUCF includes a paragraph
affirming eight governing principles for the treatment of LULUCF
activities:

treatment on the basis of sound science;

use of consistent methodologies over time for estimation and reporting of
activities;

consistency with the aim of Protocol Article 3.1 (quantified
emissions commitments);

non-inclusion in accounting of "mere presence" of carbon
stocks;

contribution to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use
of natural resources;

accounting that does not imply transfer of commitments to a
future commitment period;

accounting at the appropriate time for the reversal of a
removal of carbon from the atmosphere; and

exclusion of windfall effects from accounting.

The decision on LULUCF proposes that the Protocol Article 3.3
definitions of "forest," "afforestation," "reforestation" and
"deforestation" are based on changes in land use. Debits during
the first commitment period from harvesting following
afforestation and reforestation since 1990 are not to be greater
than credits on the same land. Each Party may choose to apply all
or a selection of additional activities - forest management,
cropland management, grazing land management and revegetation -
under Protocol Article 3.4 during the first commitment period.
These activities must be proven to be human-induced and to have
occurred since 1990.

The decision lays out the following accounting rules for the first
commitment period: net-net accounting for agricultural activities;
accounting for forest management up to the level of a possible
debit under Article 3.3; and negotiated Party caps included in an
Appendix Z for Article 3.4 activities and LULUCF resulting from
joint implementation. The decision further allows LULUCF under the
CDM in the form of afforestation and reforestation only and limits
such credits during the first commitment period.

Post-Bonn Agreement Negotiations: The negotiating group met to
develop draft decisions on LULUCF reflecting the political
decision as well as the package of documents previously discussed
in the group. A smaller drafting group co-facilitated by Andreas
Fischlin (Switzerland) and Halldor Thorgeirsson (Iceland) was
convened. Discussions centered around sections where the political
decision was considered ambiguous and where further consultation
was required, including the question of whether eligibility of
LULUCF activities under Article 12 (CDM) is decided only for the
first commitment period, or whether the current decision also
applies to future commitment periods. Other issues included the
Russian Federation proposal for an amendment to its cap on forest
management credits contained in Appendix Z, and additional
concerns regarding Party caps. The drafting group agreed on the
Co-Chairs' draft decisions on Thursday, 26 July, with the
exception of these issues. They were further discussed during
Friday, 27 July, with agreement emerging on a paragraph specifying
that LULUCF activities under the CDM in future commitment periods
shall be decided as part of the negotiations on the second
commitment period. A new paragraph was drafted allowing Parties to
request that the COP reconsider its numerical value in Appendix Z
no later than two years prior to the beginning of the first
commitment period.

On Friday, 27 July, delegates met in Plenary and decided that the
draft LULUCF decisions would be forwarded for further
consideration by, and adoption at, COP-7.

Draft decisions forwarded to COP-7: The draft decisions on LULUCF
(FCCC/CP/2001/L.11/Rev.1) incorporate the Bonn Agreement and
comprise a decision, which, inter alia:

requests SBSTA to investigate possible biome-specific forest
definitions and to develop definitions and modalities for
including LULUCF activities under the CDM; and

invites the IPCC to elaborate methods to estimate, measure,
monitor and report changes in carbon stocks as relevant to
Articles 3.3 and 3.4 and LULUCF under Articles 6 and 12, and to
prepare a report on good practice guidance and uncertainty
management.

The draft decisions on LULUCF also include a COP/MOP-1 decision.
It contains principles on LULUCF in a preamble, and adopts the
definitions, modalities, rules and guidelines related to LULUCF
under the Protocol, which are contained in an annex, with a
further appendix specifying the Annex I Party maximum credits from
Article 3.4 forest management and LULUCF activities under JI
during the first commitment period.

ENB ANALYSIS OF LULUCF:
The collapse of The Hague negotiations was attributed by
many observers to disagreements over LULUCF issues: "It was sinks
that sunk The Hague." In contrast, the negotiations in Bonn on
LULUCF issues proved to be comparatively straightforward. There
are several reasons for this. Some suggest that negotiators came
to Bonn conscious of the fact that sinks were fatal to The Hague
deal, and, with greater pressure to conclude a package, they had
an increased willingness to compromise. Ironically, the compromise
that was struck was one some noted would have satisfied the US in
The Hague.

With the US now out of the picture, the EU and G-77/China had to
make significant sacrifices to keep the rest of the Umbrella Group
on board, particularly in light of statements by Canada, Australia
and Japan that the provision of credits under Article 3.4 was the
key to ratification. An apparent trade-off for greater EU
flexibility on sinks was the insistence that nuclear energy be
removed from the CDM. While the EU's shift on sinks was a major
concession, and one that revived concerns regarding loopholes and
the renegotiation of the Protocol targets, most saw this as a
necessary and beneficial trade-off for keeping the Protocol alive.

Commentators also observed that Amb. Estrada - well-known for
forging agreements and producing results - had been brought in to
chair discussions during the ministerial session, and suggested
that his touch may have been evident. The resulting agreement was
not without controversy, however. Shortly after the ministers'
decision was agreed, but before it was formally adopted, the
Russian Federation sought to increase the level of credit they
could claim under forest management. Finding a solution for this
apparent impasse, which some saw as threatening the entire
process, required frantic scrambling to enable formal adoption of
the Bonn Agreement.

*****************************************************
3.  CLOSING PLENARY

The closing Plenary took place on Friday evening, 27 July 2001.
COP-6 President Pronk addressed delegates, stating that this
meeting advanced the implementation of the UNFCCC and brought the
Protocol closer to reality, as agreed under the BAPA. The COP then
adopted a number of decisions relating to the agenda items on
organizational, administrative and financial, and other matters,
as well as on the implementation of the BAPA.

After hearing reports from the Co-Chairs of the negotiating groups
on progress in recent days, President Pronk noted that delegates
had now come close to adopting a balanced "package" of decisions
on all issues under the BAPA. However, as a few outstanding items
remained unfinished, the draft decisions would all be forwarded to
COP-7 for final adoption. He pointed out that agreement had been
reached on ten decisions, including those on financial issues,
meaning their adoption at COP-7 would be a formality. Outstanding
issues include texts on guidelines under Protocol Articles 5, 7
and 8, compliance, the mechanisms and LULUCF. The COP took note of
progress made and agreed to forward texts to COP-7 for final
elaboration and adoption.

President Pronk highlighted his aims of encouraging intensive work
on the texts, safeguarding the integrity of the political decision
- or "Bonn Agreement" on fulfilling the BAPA - and ensuring a fair
process. He thanked delegates for their hard work, and said he has
received confirmation from all groups that completion of the work
will take place at COP-7 in way that is faithful to the Bonn
Agreement. He added that the Bonn Agreement will make the Protocol
ratifiable.

President Pronk praised the Bonn Agreement and the other
achievements at this session as an outcome of dialogue, mutual
understanding, and compromise, and evidence of the value of
multilateral negotiations. He reminded delegates of their promise
at the end of The Hague session not to wait another year to
succeed with their negotiations, and said he was proud of the
results achieved in Bonn. He expressed confidence that the
remaining work, which is non-political, will be concluded at COP-
7.

The COP then adopted the report of the session (FCCC/CP/2001/L.1
and Add.1).

Following this, Parties then made closing statements. Many thanked
President Pronk for his significant contribution to the outcome of
the resumed COP-6, and also expressed their gratitude to UNFCCC
Executive Secretary Michael Zammit Cutajar and his staff.

Iran, on behalf of the G-77/China, said the Group had come to Bonn
to finish unfinished work, and thanked all participants for the
positive atmosphere of cooperation and understanding. On matters
relating to compliance, he indicated that the G-77/China welcomed
the Co-Chairs'non-paper (FCCC/CP/2001/CRP12/Rev.1) as a good basis
for discussions, and said the adoption of legally binding
consequences remained a major objective for the Group.

Bulgaria, for CG-11, urged Parties to continue to demonstrate the
flexibility and goodwill evident in Bonn at COP-7. Samoa, for
AOSIS, said the resumed COP-6 outcomes have breathed new life into
the Protocol, adding that delegates have taken an historic step
towards creating an environmentally responsible, carbon restrained
world. He indicated his appreciation to those Annex I countries
involved in the Political Declaration on new and additional
funding assistance. While noting that the Protocol is "only a
modest first step," he highlighted its key role as offering "the
only viable lifeline."

Belgium, for the EU, said the Bonn Agreement lays a foundation for
the successful conclusion of these ongoing negotiations. He said
he was hopeful that a balanced and comprehensive package of
decisions will be achieved at COP-7.

Australia welcomed the significant progress since the "historic"
Bonn Agreement on Monday, 23 July. He noted with satisfaction
agreement on issues such as finance and technology transfer, and
looked forward to completing work on all outstanding texts at COP-
7.

Vanuatu, on behalf of the LDCs, welcomed in particular text on
UNFCCC Article 4.8 and 4.9. He highlighted the need to involve
youth and their spokespeople in the process. Japan stressed the
progress in talks over recent days, while noting that much remains
to be done to bridge differences on compliance, the mechanisms and
LULUCF. He said Parties should strive to complete work on all
outstanding issues at COP-7. New Zealand said it came to Bonn to
say "yes" to an agreement. He said the Bonn Agreement has provided
such an affirmation, and removed remaining questions surrounding
the ratifiability of the Protocol. Morocco extended a welcome to
Parties to continue at Marrakech the achievements in Bonn.
President Pronk declared the resumed COP-6 closed at 10:30 pm.

***************************************************
4.  A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF COP-6 PART II

Confounding the predictions of many, the gavel came down late
Monday morning - midway through the two week meeting - and
delegates rose in a standing ovation to complete a marathon
weekend of negotiations and seal what many saw as an "historic"
political agreement that saved the Kyoto Protocol. Few climate
pundits had predicted a positive outcome in Bonn, and it was thus
not surprising that praise on reaching a political agreement was
effusive. Michael Meacher, UK Minister for the Environment,
described it as "a brilliant day for the environment"; Peter
Hodgson, New Zealand's Energy Minister, said "we have delivered
probably the most comprehensive and difficult agreement in
history"; and an NGO campaigner said that "this first small step
is a giant leap for humanity and for the future of our planet."

Four days later, when President Pronk formally closed COP-6 Part
II late on Friday evening, the euphoria was far more muted. Not
only were observers coming to appreciate the nature of the
sacrifices made to achieve this agreement, but - more importantly
- differences had appeared in the interpretation of Monday's
groundbreaking agreement. At one stage, shortly after most of the
world's press had retired home comfortable in the belief that an
agreement had been secured, it appeared as if the entire package
was in danger of unraveling, with the Russian Federation and other
Umbrella Group members flexing their muscles and disputing the
terms of the agreement. This development, coupled with the failure
to reach closure on certain key issues - notably compliance - was
a sobering reminder that ratification of the Protocol is not yet
assured, nor is its environmental integrity guaranteed.

"THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN"

Notwithstanding these concerns, the achievement of the last two
weeks should not be underestimated. Expectations of delivery at
Bonn had been low. In the words of one observer, "only
professional optimists" were predicting success, with some
commentators forecasting the end of the Protocol and "a descent
into environmental anarchy." President Pronk had set himself an
ambitious agenda, and the initial prognosis was not good. Since
the collapse of talks in The Hague, the US had pronounced the
Protocol "fatally flawed" and withdrawn from the process, leaving
Pronk with no viable alternative but to broker a deal that was
sufficiently attractive to Japan and the Russian Federation, while
at the same time maintaining the commitment of the EU and
developing countries. Despite an active round of shuttle
diplomacy, and a number of preliminary high-level meetings, there
was no evidence prior to Bonn that the gulf of disagreement had
been bridged. Midway through the first week of the Bonn talks, and
shortly before the arrival of ministers, this gulf was still
apparent.

It is against this backdrop of significant political divisions,
and low expectations, that the euphoria of Monday's agreement
should be seen. Despite the significant compromises that were
made, the agreement is nevertheless hugely significant in that it
has affirmed President Pronk's long stated assertion that the
Protocol is the "only game in town."

"KYOTO LITE" - TAKING THE FIRST STEP

COP 6 Part II will be remembered primarily for having produced the
"Bonn Agreement," a political commitment on a package of issues
that has facilitated ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. While to
some observers the Bonn Agreement "falls far short of the lofty
goals contained in the original Kyoto proposal," leading one NGO
to refer to the agreement as "Kyoto Lite," there was nevertheless
general support, even among some of the more skeptical NGOs, that
a weak agreement was better than none.

The following is a brief analysis of some of the key elements
negotiated under the Bonn Agreement, and in talks on The Hague
texts.

Finance: While the financial issues group was the only one to
approve all of its draft decisions, there were diverging views on
the final outcome. Although the agreement recognizes the need for
"new and additional funding," and establishes three new funds, no
specific funding level is identified and there are no new legal
requirements on countries to provide funding. Pronk's suggested
US$1 billion became an unrealistic option with US withdrawal from
the Protocol.

The Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund is funded by a CDM levy and
voluntary contributions. From a developing country perspective,
the texts mirror the compromise that they made in the Bonn
Agreement, under which they lost out on their previous insistence
on mandatory funding levels or any setting of funding levels. As
one developing country delegate expressed it "They have shown us
the blank checks, now the question is will they actually enter any
figures."

LULUCF: The collapse of The Hague negotiations was attributed by
many observers to disagreements over LULUCF issues: "It was sinks
that sunk The Hague." In contrast, the negotiations in Bonn on
LULUCF issues proved to be comparatively straightforward. There
are several reasons for this. Some suggest that negotiators came
to Bonn conscious of the fact that sinks were fatal to The Hague
deal, and, with greater pressure to conclude a package, they had
an increased willingness to compromise. Ironically, the compromise
that was struck was one some noted would have satisfied the US in
The Hague.

With the US now out of the picture, the EU and G-77/China had to
make significant sacrifices to keep the rest of the Umbrella Group
on board, particularly in light of statements by Canada, Australia
and Japan that the provision of credits under Article 3.4 was the
key to ratification. An apparent trade-off for greater EU
flexibility on sinks was the insistence that nuclear energy be
removed from the CDM. While the EU's shift on sinks was a major
concession, and one that revived concerns regarding loopholes and
the renegotiation of the Protocol targets, most saw this as a
necessary and beneficial trade-off for keeping the Protocol alive.

Commentators also observed that Amb. Estrada - well-known for
forging agreements and producing results - had been brought in to
chair discussions during the ministerial session, and suggested
that his touch may have been evident. The resulting agreement was
not without controversy, however. Shortly after the ministers'
decision was agreed, but before it was formally adopted, the
Russian Federation sought to increase the level of credit they
could claim under forest management. Finding a solution for this
apparent impasse, which some saw as threatening the entire
process, required frantic scrambling to enable formal adoption of
the Bonn Agreement.

Mechanisms: Clarifying the nature and scope of the Kyoto
mechanisms has always been one of the key determinants for
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Annex I Parties. Although
delegates were unable to resolve all of the technical issues and
produce a clean text, they nevertheless laid a solid foundation
for a positive outcome at COP-7. Key to this was the political
agreement that was reached on the identified "core issues,"
including supplementarity, eligibility, share of proceeds, the
composition of the executive board, and sinks and nuclear
facilities in the CDM. Agreement was also reached on technical
issues such as baselines and additionality, small-scale CDM
project activities, environmental impact assessments, public
participation, and review by the executive board. As with a number
of the other key issues, the EU made several important compromises
on its previously stated positions, most notably on sinks. While
they may seek some solace in the text on nuclear facilities, and
parts of the text on eligibility requirements, it is evident that
the desire to ensure the participation of key Umbrella Group
countries greatly outweighed their aspirations for a stronger
Protocol.

Compliance: For seasoned observers of the compliance negotiations,
developments in Bonn were unexpected. Following the solid progress
on this issue in The Hague, many expected that the Bonn
negotiations would be comparatively straightforward. The opening
days in Bonn dashed such optimistic forecasts, and served as a
rude reminder to delegates that "nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed." While most delegates left The Hague
believing that the compliance regime would be legally binding and
would provide for clear deterrent consequences along the lines
proposed by the EU and developing countries, they soon realized in
Bonn that even these core elements were forcefully disputed. A key
reason for this change was the US withdrawal from the
negotiations. This resulted in a significant shift in bargaining
leverage on those key positions where, in the past, the US had
sided with the EU and the G-77/China, rather than with other
members of the Umbrella Group. The absence of US participation on
these key issues, coupled with the need to ensure ratification in
particular by the Russian Federation and Japan, resulted in a
shift in bargaining power towards those positions favored by the
other Umbrella Group members. This was particularly apparent in
discussions on the legally-binding nature of enforcement
consequences, an issue that the US, EU, Canada and the G-77/China
had all supported in The Hague, and where the preference of
Australia, Japan and the Russian Federation for a "politically
binding" compliance regime was a minority view apparently with
little chance of success. The US withdrawal, and the need for
ratification by a suitable combination of these three countries,
dramatically influenced the diplomatic negotiating landscape.

The impact of this change was most clearly evidenced during the
final stages of the high-level segment, where the issue of
compliance constituted the major stumbling block for reaching a
political agreement, necessitating late night calls to capitals
and resulting in several amendments to the original Pronk "core
elements" proposal. Unfortunately, the compromise amendment
relating to the mode of adoption of the compliance regime, and its
link with the legally binding nature of the compliance regime,
later proved to be ambiguous, with major disagreement arising over
its interpretation. During the final meetings of the compliance
negotiating group, numerous amendments were proposed to the
technical text by Australia, Japan, Canada and the Russian
Federation, which some suggest has "effectively unraveled any
progress" that had been made on compliance during the previous few
years. The outcome of these meetings left some delegates openly
expressing "deep disappointment and frustration."

Despite not completing its work on compliance, COP-6 Part II made
significant advances. These include the elaboration by the Co-
Chairs of an unbracketed non-paper that will serve as the basis
for the resumed negotiations at COP-7, as well as securing
political consensus on several key issues of a compliance system,
including a breakthrough regarding the composition of the
Compliance Committee.

"PLAY IT, (UNCLE) SAM."

As climate change observers look ahead to COP-7 in Morocco - a
country synonymous to many with Bogart, Bergman and Casablanca - a
question uppermost on the minds of many is the extent to which the
US will be persuaded to join the climate caravan.  Will the US
play it, "as time goes by?"

Although the US was noticeably less intrusive in Bonn - seemingly
sticking to their commitment not to prevent others from moving
ahead - their presence was nevertheless ubiquitous. While some
observers claim to have seen the hand of the US in various
submissions by other Parties (most notably that by Nigeria on
eligibility during the first week of negotiations) their impact on
the negotiations was far more pervasive than indulging in a little
backroom lobbying.

For many observers, an overriding objective of the Bonn meeting
was to defy the US, by demonstrating that the Protocol could
survive without its participation. This sentiment was most evident
during the high-level plenary on Monday, 23 July, when the current
spokesperson for the G-77/China stated that the political
agreement was a "triumph for multilateralism over unilateralism."
This thinly veiled attack on the US position, which was warmly
applauded by the packed conference hall, was further underlined by
President Pronk. Noting the growing sentiment against
globalization, typified by the G-8 protests in Genoa, Pronk
stressed that the Bonn Agreement demonstrates "the centrality of
the concept of international cooperation for the higher common
benefit of the global community."

US head of delegation, Paula Dobriansky, appeared unmoved and -
despite being heckled - was unapologetic in reiterating the US
position against ratification. Interestingly though, she referred
to the Protocol as "not sound policy," a shift from earlier
statements that it was "fatally flawed" (and a subtle shift too
from her original written statement, in which she apparently
deleted reference to "deeply flawed").

While it remains unlikely that the US position on ratification
will change in the near future, there is no doubt that the Bonn
Agreement has affected the international political economy of
climate change. As European Environment Commissioner Margot
Wallstrom put it shortly after the deal had been struck: "I think
something has changed today in the balance of power between the US
and the EU." Or as one US observer said: "this is a major foreign
policy defeat for President Bush."

The nature of the changing relationship was underlined by
President Pronk in his final press conference, late Friday night,
where he emphasized that the US no longer speaks of the Protocol
as being dead. He also noted that the US business community and
various Senators are beginning to appreciate that isolation on
this issue will have an impact on US economic interests. With
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol now more likely, he suggested
that there is now an increased possibility that "it won't take
many years before there is at least a 'joint track' approach with
the US in addressing climate change."

THE BONN AGREEMENT: "THE BEGINNING OF A BEAUTIFUL FRIENDSHIP?"

Despite the significant achievement in reaching political
consensus, it became apparent towards the end of the Bonn meeting
that not all Parties were "maintaining the spirit of Monday's
historic agreement." This was most evident in the varying
interpretations offered on the legally binding nature of the
compliance regime. Some observers have questioned the motives
behind the increasingly evident collaboration between Canada, the
Russian Federation, Australia and Japan, even on issues upon which
individual interests were not at stake.

While it is unlikely that - in the words of Humphrey Bogart - the
Bonn Agreement will necessarily be the beginning of a beautiful
friendship, it is clear that it has laid the foundation for
possible ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. In his closing
statement, Raúl Estrada, one of the chief architects of the Kyoto
Protocol, underlined that COP-6 Part II has brought a "new
dynamism to the Protocol process, and served to give new weight in
our endeavors towards prompt ratification." But as the
disagreements in the final few days of the Bonn meeting showed,
there is no guarantee just yet that the Protocol will be ratified,
and if so, at what cost to its environmental integrity.

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