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Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
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Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer

Pursuant to Article 8 of the Montreal Protocol, the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP) in 1989 appointed an Ad-Hoc Working Group of Legal Experts to develop procedures and institutional mechanisms to determine and address issues of non-compliance. A set of interim procedures and institutional mechanisms was adopted a year later, and the 4th MOP (in 1992) formally adopted a final non-compliance procedure (with an Implementation Committee) as well as an “Indicative List of Measures that Might be Taken by a Meeting of the Parties in Respect of Non-compliance with the Protocol.” To summarise briefly, the procedure worked as follows:

  • If one of the Parties has “reservations regarding another Party’s implementation of its obligations under the Protocol, those concerns may be addressed in writing to the Secretariat.” The reply from the State at stake and the original submission shall be transmitted to an Implementation Committee. The Committee consists of members from 10 Parties.
  • This Implementation Committee may also be informed by a Party that “despite having made its best, bona fide efforts, it is unable to comply fully with the obligations under the Protocol”. It can also, in some specific cases, be informed by the Secretariat of the Protocol itself that a Party may be in non-compliance with the Protocol.
  • The functions of the Implementation Committee consist of gathering and requesting information in those cases where it is involved, “with a view to securing an amicable solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the provisions of the Protocol.” The Implementation Committee submits its report to the MOP, which reviews the information and recommendations to decide the best way “to bring about full compliance with the Protocol.” The Implementation Committee may assist the MOP in that task, but the MOP — not the Committee — is charged with making the decision. As a practical matter, the MOP thus far has accepted all of the recommendations of the Implementation Committee.

By 1994, the Montreal Protocol reporting system had revealed that some Parties experienced large-scale compliance problems. In particular, the Newly Independent States that were formerly part of the Soviet Union were experiencing profound economic, political, and social transitions that affected their ability to comply. The findings, which were reported initially to the Secretariat and key members of the Implementation Committee and technical advisory panels, were confirmed by a joint statement from the Parties and a subsequent letter from the Russian Prime Minister, stating that Russia did not expect to be able to comply with deadlines for phasing out Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS).

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